Part B

　　Directions:

　　In the following article, some sentences have been removed. For Questions 41-45, choose the most suitable one from the list A-F to fit into each of the numbered blank. There is one extra choice that does not fit in any of the gaps. Mark your answers on ANSWER SHEET 1.(10 points)

　　Theories of the value of art are of two kinds, which we may call extrinsic and intrinsic. The first regards art and the appreciation of art as means to some recognized moral good, while the second regards them as valuable not instrumentally but as objects unto themselves. It is characteristic of extrinsic theories to locate the value of art in its effects on the person who appreciates it. (41) .

　　The extrinsic approach, adopted in modern times by Leo Tolstoy in Chto takoye iskusstvo? (1896; What Is Art?), has seldom seemed wholly satisfactory. Philosophers have constantly sought for a value in aesthetic experience that is unique to it and that, therefore, could not be obtained from any other source. The extreme version of this intrinsic approach is that associated with Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde, and the French Symbolists, and summarized in the slogan “art for art’s sake.” (42) .

　　Between those two extreme views there lies, once again, a host of intermediate positions. We believe, for example, that works of art must be appreciated for their own sake, but that, in the act of appreciation, we gain from them something that is of independent value. (43) .

　　The analogy with laughter—which, in some views, is itself a species of aesthetic interest—introduces a concept without which there can be no serious discussion of the value of art: the concept of taste. (44) .

　　Similarly, we regard some works of art as worthy of our attention and others as not. In articulating this judgment, we use all of the diverse and confusing vocabulary of moral appraisal; works of art, like people, are condemned for their sentimentality, coarseness, vulgarity, cruelty, or self-indulgence, and equally praised for their warmth, compassion, nobility, sensitivity, and truthfulness. (The same may apply to the object of natural beauty.) Clearly, if aesthetic interest has a positive value, it is only when motivated by good taste; it is only interest in appropriate objects that can be said to be good for us. (45) .

　　[A] Thus a joke is laughed at for its own sake, even though there is an independent value in laughter, which lightens our lives by taking us momentarily outside ourselves. Why should not something similar be said of works of art, many of which aspire to be amusing in just the way that good jokes are?

　　[B] All discussion of the value of art tends, therefore, to turn from the outset in the direction of criticism: Can there be genuine critical evaluation of art, a genuine distinction between that which deserves our attention and that which does not? (And, once again, the question may be extended to objects of natural beauty.)

　　[C] Art is held to be a form of education, perhaps an education of the emotions. In this case, it becomes an open question whether there might not be some more effective means to the same result. Alternatively, one may attribute a negative value to art, as Plato did in his Republic, arguing that art has a corrupting or diseducative effect on those exposed to it.

　　[D] Artistic appreciation, a purely personal matter, calls for appropriate means of expression. Yet, it is before anything a process of “cultivation”, during which a certain part of one’s “inner self” is “dug out” and some knowledeg of the outside world becomes its match.

　　[E] If I am amused it is for a reason, and this reason lies in the object of my amusement. We thus begin to think in terms of a distinction between good and bad reasons for laughter. Amusement at the wrong things may seem to us to show corruption of mind, cruelty, or bad taste; and when it does so, we speak of the object as not truly amusing, and feel that we have reason on our side.

　　[F] Such thinkers and writers believe that art is not only an end in itself but also a sufficient justification of itself. They also hold that in order to understand art as it should be understood, it is necessary to put aside all interests other than an interest in the work itself.

　　答案

　　41.C 42.F 43.A 44.E 45.B

　　試題精解

　　41.[精解] 本題考核的知識點是：上下文內(nèi)容的銜接。

　　本題空格出現(xiàn)在第一段末。第一段前兩句提出了兩種藝術(shù)價值理論：外在理論和內(nèi)在理論。空格處的上一句，即第三句和空格處后的第一句，即第二段第一句都是對外在理論的討論。所以，空格處的內(nèi)容應(yīng)該與上下文一致，也對外在價值理論予以討論。選項[C]是關(guān)于藝術(shù)對于藝術(shù)欣賞者的影響，屬于外在價值理論的觀點，且恰好是對其上一句的闡釋。

　　42. [精解] 本題考核知識點：上下文內(nèi)容的銜接 + 段落主題 + 指代詞的理解。

　　本題空格出現(xiàn)在第二段末。從上文來看，第二段的第二句開始由對藝術(shù)外在價值理論的討論轉(zhuǎn)入對藝術(shù)內(nèi)在價值理論的討論。從下文來看，緊接空格處的第三段第一句指出：這兩種極端理論之間還有一些折中的觀點。所以，空格處內(nèi)容肯定是對內(nèi)在價值理論的討論。[F]為合適選項。且其中的such thinkers and writers恰好指上文提到的 Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde and the French Symbolists，上下文之間銜接自然。

　　43. [精解] 本題考核知識點：上下文內(nèi)容的銜接 + 段落主題。

　　本空格的上文指出： 藝術(shù)外在價值理論和藝術(shù)內(nèi)在價值理論之間存在著折中的觀點：對于藝術(shù)的欣賞應(yīng)該基于藝術(shù)本身(內(nèi)在)，而對藝術(shù)的欣賞過程中則會有獨立價值的東西(外在)。下文中提到：這種和笑聲的類比本身就是一種審美價值。所以，空格處必定是利用“笑聲”來類比折中的藝術(shù)價值理論。[A]說明：笑聲是因為笑話本身的可笑(內(nèi)在)，但笑聲又有其獨立的價值——點亮我們的生活(外在價值)。恰好符合上下文的銜接，為正確選項。

　　44. [精解] 本題考核知識點：和上文內(nèi)容的銜接 + 副詞的運用。

　　本空格的上文剛剛引出了一個新的抽象概念：品味�？崭竦南挛睦�用simiarly說明，審美價值也正面和負(fù)面之分。緊接著，在審美價值(aesthetic interest)和品味(taste)之間建立聯(lián)系。所以，空格處內(nèi)容必然是對“品味”進(jìn)行解釋，并說明品味有好壞之分。這恰恰是選項[E]的內(nèi)容

　　45. [精解] 本題考核知識點：對上文內(nèi)容的總結(jié)

　　本空格出現(xiàn)在文章結(jié)尾處，所以必然是對上文內(nèi)容的總結(jié)，[B]中 “all discussion of the value of art tends, therefore”非常適合做全文內(nèi)容的總結(jié)。再對[B]的內(nèi)容進(jìn)行分析，其恰好是基于全文的討論，利用一個疑問句指出對藝術(shù)價值評判的關(guān)鍵問題：是否真的存在真正的臨界評價。

　　全文翻譯

　　藝術(shù)價值理論有兩種，我們稱之為外在理論和內(nèi)在理論。前者將藝術(shù)和對藝術(shù)的欣賞看作是達(dá)到某種公認(rèn)的道德利益的手段;而后者看到的不是它們工具性的價值而是投向自身物體的價值。外在理論的特點是將藝術(shù)價值定位于其對藝術(shù)欣賞者的影響。藝術(shù)被認(rèn)為是一種教育形式，也許是一種情感教育。在這種情況下，是否有一些達(dá)到同樣效果的更有效的方法成了公開的問題�；蛘�，人們也許認(rèn)為藝術(shù)有負(fù)面價值，正如柏拉圖在他的《理想國》一書里所認(rèn)為的那樣，藝術(shù)會影響那些接觸它的人，使其墮落，或起不到教化作用。[C]

　　現(xiàn)代社會中被列夫托爾斯泰吸收進(jìn)1896年出版的《藝術(shù)論》一書中的外在理論，似乎不能完全令人滿意。哲學(xué)家們一直在不懈地探索唯美體驗中的價值。這種價值是獨一無二的，因此不能從別處獲得。極端的內(nèi)在理論與華特·佩特、奧斯卡·王爾德及法國印象主義者聯(lián)系在一起，總結(jié)為一句口號：“為藝術(shù)而藝術(shù)”。這些思想家和作家相信：藝術(shù)的目的在于其本身，而且藝術(shù)也是對其自身的證明。他們還相信，若要以正確的方式理解藝術(shù)，必須放棄對其他方面的關(guān)注而只關(guān)注藝術(shù)作品本身。[F]

　　在這兩種極端的觀點之間，有一些折中的觀點。比如，我們認(rèn)為對藝術(shù)品的欣賞必須基于作品本身，而我們在欣賞過程中能從中獲得一些獨立的價值。對笑話發(fā)笑是因為笑話本身可笑，但笑聲本身又有獨立的價值，這一價值使得使我們能在片刻間脫離自己，點亮生活。在這一點上，藝術(shù)作品又何嘗不具有相似性?許多藝術(shù)作品渴望著與好的笑話一樣具有娛樂性。[A]

　　有些人認(rèn)為，這種和笑聲的類比本身就是一種審美價值。它引進(jìn)了一個新的概念——品味。若沒有這一概念，就不可能對藝術(shù)價值做嚴(yán)肅的討論。若我感到有趣，肯定有其原因。此“原因”存在于令我感到有趣的對象。因此，我們開始考慮對令人發(fā)笑的好的原因和壞的原因進(jìn)行區(qū)分。對不好的事情感到有趣說明我們思想墮落、殘忍或?qū)徝姥酃獠?出現(xiàn)這樣的情況，我們會說對象本身并不真正有趣，我們之所以感到有趣是因為我們自身的原因。[E]

　　與之相似的是，我們認(rèn)為某些藝術(shù)品值得關(guān)注，而另外一些卻不值得。在作此判斷時，我們會利用各種令人費解的、評判道德的詞匯; 藝術(shù)品和人一樣，會因為其感傷、粗俗、殘忍、或自我放縱受到譴責(zé)，會因為其熱情、同情、高尚、敏感和真實受到褒揚。顯然，若要有積極的審美價值，必須有好的審美眼光;只有對恰當(dāng)?shù)奈矬w感興趣才對我們有益處。因此，所有對藝術(shù)價值的討論都趨向背離了起初的評論方向：會有對藝術(shù)的真正臨界評價嗎?即，在值得關(guān)注的作品和不值得關(guān)注的作品之間，存在著真正的界限嗎?[B]